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ABSTRACT The maximizing strategy for livestock herding of the East African pastoral
nomads has been accused as irrational and thereby destroying the ecological balance of
rangeland. Carrying capacity and pastoral productivity promoted in state policies, however,
are arbitrary concepts. This paper finds the maximizing strategy of indigenous herders more
adaptive to the precarious and drought-ridden tropical arid zone, using the Rendille herding
as the main example. The Rendille further buffer themselves from market economy through
manipulation of the local dual economy and the symbiotic personal relationship with the
local livestock dealers. 
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INTRODUCTION
The pastoral nomads in East Africa breed camel, cattle, goats, sheep and donkeys
altogether, which is called the multiple-stock herding. The balance among the vari-
ous types of livestock varies according to regional ecological differences. The prin-
cipal stock shifts gradually from cattle combined with small stock to camels
combined with small stock, as aridity increases. Also, the relative degree of the
social and cultural values vested in livestock is different from society to society. The
Eastern Nilotic Maasai, Samburu, Ariaal, Turkana, Karimojong, Jie peoples, and the
Eastern Cushitic Boran and Dasanetch peoples value cattle more than camels, and
conversely, the East Cushitic Somali, Rendille and Gabbra peoples value camels
more than cattle. In all the pastoral societies, however, herders make for their own
living within the socio-ecological framework of the openland. Living as they do
symbiotically with their livestock, their rhythm of life is dominated by the needs of
the animals. Anything that affects the life of flocks and herds affects humans just as
acutely.
These pastoral nomads live off their livestock who provide them with the pastoral
diet of milk, blood and meat. Far from treating their livestock merely as sources of
meat, milk, and cash, they display an obsessive reverence for their livestock. They
use them in marriage settlements to acquire wives and children, as compensation for
injures and death. Livestock are used in social exchange to adjust and activate per-
sonal relationships. Also, they offer livestock to gods and spirits, and communicate
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with the spiritual world. With these and a multitude of other social and symbolic
significance, livestock represent the ideal prestige wealth, the measure of a man’s
substance and success. 
However, pastoral nomads’ comprehensive and obsessive concern with livestock
is accused as pre-modern, obstructing the development of state economy which aims
to incorporate livestock into market economy (Herskovits, 1926; Murdock, 1959;
Lomax & Arensberg, 1977; FAO, 1980; Lamprey, 1983). In Kenya, so many range-
land specialists have criticized the maximizing strategy of indigenous herders as
leading to the destruction of ecological balance through overgrazing and overstock-
ing. These specialists presume that livestock should be bred according to the carry-
ing capacity of rangeland. Therefore, every policy effort has been to maintain
ecological balance by culling “excessive” livestock from the herd that outgrew the
optimal size.
This rangeland policy was already in effect during the colonial times. The govern-
ment changed taxation to be paid from livestock to money. At the same time,
herders were assigned and restricted into their “tribal” zone. Furthermore, livestock
were extracted from the indigenous herds on the grounds that overstocking should
be avoided (Dalleo, 1975; Sobania, 1980). The independent government has fol-
lowed the colonial policy of market economy for pastoral production. The IPAL
(Integrated Project in Arid Lands) project, started in 1976 in Marsabit District, was
put in effect to integrate the local pastoral production into state-wide market econ-
omy (Fratkin, 1991). Many herders were employed by this project and itinerant auc-
tions and shops were facilitated to advance consumerism. Moreover, the livestock
auctions were frequently held in order to enforce livestock supply from the herders.
Consequently, opportunities for wage labour and commodity exchange increased,
and market economy of livestock was promoted by the IPAL project.
A policy to promote livestock supply to the market intended profit expansion
through market exchange. But such economic transactions were principally different
from indigenous livestock transactions that aimed to promote social coexistence
through reciprocal interpersonal relationships. It is a serious problem how the
indigenous transaction is balanced with the market economy transaction because it
lies at the core of how subsistence economy and credit transaction should be. This
essay reexamines the concept of carrying capacity used to advance so-called rational
production of livestock for market economy. By illustrating the functions the social
transactions of livestock play in the social life of the herders, I will show why it is
difficult to integrate nomadic pastoralism into market economy. 
ECOLOGICAL CARRYING CAPACITY AND HERD DYNAMICS
I. Carrying Capacity of Rangeland and the Optimal Herd-Size
Market economy policy depends on surplus livestock steadily supplied to the
market under the condition that optimal herd-size is kept in balance with the carry-
ing capacity of the rangeland. This idea is derived from ranching management in the
temperate zone, where livestock is bred within an enclosure with waterhole and pas-
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turage. In this case, a rational target is that the feeding efficiency of livestock should
be in balance with animal growth to cut down feeding cost. In contrast, nomadic
herding is accompanied by rearing livestock and movement of humans and live-
stock, and does not work with the efficiency of the man-made environment.
The concept of optimal herd-size was emphasized by Hardin in the thesis of
“tragedy of commons” (1968). He had two presuppositions. First, the pasture of
joint ownership is freely open to private use. Second, livestock are owned privately
by individuals. The cost increase of a communal pasture for a head of livestock
should impose equal burden on the individuals who share it. But each individual
tries to maximize his herd-size, because each monopolizes the profit earned by
increasing the herd-size. This leads to overgrazing, exceeding the limit of carrying
capacity of the pasture. Hardin thus denied the communal system of the pasture.
But, Hardin has come under criticism (Horowitz & Little, 1987). First, the pre-
supposition of communal resources for individual freedom is completely unrealistic.
The pursuit of private profit does not escape communal control (Taussig, 1980).
Second, the carrying capacity of the pasture is difficult to determine precisely, and it
is a vague and unpractical concept in the tropical zone where the livestock popula-
tion fluctuates violently. Moreover, it is doubtful whether livestock grow to the limit
of carrying capacity in reality. Dietz (1987), who studied the correlation between
livestock population and climate change in Pokotland of western Kenya, concluded
that overgrazing never occured in reality, because livestock died in periodical
droughts, before ever reaching the limit of carrying capacity.
Furthermore, the concept of optimal livestock population is not realistic in the
drought-ridden zone of arid East Africa. When Turkanaland was devastated by the
severe drought of 1979-81, so many livestock died a natural death, and many people
starved. People were forced to give up herding. Only the households with relatively
many livestock managed to weather this drought (Itani, 1981; Ohta, 1980). This
demonstrates the adaptive meaning of maximization strategy.
It has been reported that herding has higher pastoral productivity than ranching.
Cossins (1985) concluded that herding productivity in the Boranland of southern
Ethiopia was higher than that of ranching in Australia with a similar climate to
Boranland. The pastoral Boran produced four times as much protein and six times as
much food energy as the Australian ranching in terms of productivity per hectare.
Also, the Boran herding was more favorable than the Australian ranching in terms
of in-put cost. One-kilogram of protein was produced at the monetary cost of 1.9-3.9
US$ by Australian ranching, and of 2.0 US$ by Laikipia ranching in Kenya,
whereas the Boran herders produced 1 kg of protein at the cost of only 0.1-0.3 US$.
Per capita productivity is generally presumed higher for ranching than for herd-
ing. However, comparison by production per unit area of protein quantity and food
energy and the amount of monetary investment, herding turned out to be more pro-
ductive than ranching. Thus, different conclusions can be drawn with different mea-
sures of productivity. It is wrong to apply the general idea of the optimal herd-size,
which is standardized for the temperate ranching system, to the herding system in
the arid land with unstable and drought-ridden conditions. 
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II. Multiplication and Reduction of Herd-Size
The East African herd compositions by age and sex are fragmentally available
(Ohta, 1982; Sato, 1980). Based on 20 herds of Rendille camels, an average herd-
size was 49 heads of camels, including stud-camels (3%), ox-camels (15%), cow-
camels (62%), juvenile camels (10%), and calf-camels (11%) (Sato, 1980). An
average herd of camels of the Ariaal in the southern part of the Rendilleland had
similar composition to the Rendille’s (Fratkin, 1980). The compositions of cattle
herds in four cattle-raising societies of the Turkana (Ohta, 1980), the Karimojong
(Dyson-Hudson, 1966), the Bodi (Fukui, 1979), and the Lokoro (Kurimoto, 1981)
revealed that the percentage of oxen increased from 1 to 23% as the average herd-
size increased. This means that more surplus oxen are kept in larger herds. Oxen are
used in household consumption, social transactions and sales. Beyond the number of
heads necessary for the socio-economic life, oxen are neither culled entirely or
increased, but are kept as surplus at hand. On the other hand, as herd-size increased
from 20 to 181 heads, the number of the cows to a bull increased from 6 to 11 heads,
and conversely the percentage of cows in a herd decreased from 43 to 34%, and that
of bulls from 7 to 3%.
Every herd of any size is assigned at least 1-2 heads of bull, whereas bulls are not
assigned to a herd in proportion with the number of cows. A bull can copulate with
as many cows for breeding. Comparing the herd-size of camels with that of cattle,
the camel herd is smaller than the cattle herd. The ratio of breeding males is lower in
the camel herd than in the cattle herd. The ratio of castrated animals and that of
adult females is higher in the camel herd than in the cattle herd. It is because the ox-
camels are reared for meat, cash and packing that more castrated males are kept at
hand. 
The ratio of cow-camels is higher than that of cows because cow-camels have a
longer reproductive period than cows. A cow gives birth to its first calf at 3-4 years
of age, and continues giving birth for approximately 10 years thereafter. The cow-
camel reproduces at 4-5 years of age, and continues giving birth for approximately
20 years thereafter. Thus, adult females are more abundant in the camel herd than in
the cattle herd.
The annual rate of herd growth is estimated at 3.4% in the camel herd (Sato,
1980), 4-10% (Allan, 1965) or 5.6-14% (Spencer, 1965) in the cattle herd. Dahl &
Hjort (1976) simulated the increase rate of livestock variety by using many supposi-
tions, and showed that a little change in the variables such as the year of age for the
first childbirth, birth rate, and death rate would result in a great fluctuation of herd
population. Such drastic changes threaten the herd population dynamics in East
Africa with periodical droughts. When a herd population declines due to a drought,
the death rate of juvenile and old-aged animals increases, and the birth rate also
decreases. Also, the off-take rate of animals increases with household consumption
and sale.
According to Itani (1981, 1982), when the Turkana experienced the devastating
drought of 1979-81, goat population decreased by 41%, sheep by 7.4 %, cattle by 70
%, and camels by 41%. The Turkana made every effort to keep the cattle they cul-
turally esteem the most. This tendency was also pointed out in the Somali society
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with its importance attached to the camel (Cassanelli, 1982). The recovery process
of the herds, has been reported for the Isiolo Boran (Hogg, 1980) and the Maasai
(Meadow & White, 1979). The annual rate of increase was 28% a year for the cattle
herd, three years after the 1975-76 drought in the Boranland. In the Maasailand, it
was at 24% for the cattle herd in 1964, three years after the 1960-61 drought, but it
declined to 7% in 1968. Herd-size is subject to drastic fluctuations by the drought.
Furthermore, the kind of livestock kept at the time of the drought is determined by
the cultural value. The higher the cultural value for a livestock species, the more
effort is made to keep them. The model of optimal herd-size should be applied to
actual herds with consideration of cultural and time factors.
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OVER LIVESTOCK
I. Economic Aspect of Livestock
Pastoral nomads live on the pastoral diet of milk, blood and meat from their live-
stock. Yet not all the members of a household can be supported with their livestock,
depending on the number of livestock (Spooner, 1973; Dahl & Hjort, 1976). Some
herders (the Samburu) thus supplement livestock products by imported grain of
maize or sorghum. Others (the Rendille) vary their diet between settlements and
herding camps. They have mainly livestock products in the herding camps and eat
more grain in the settlements (Sato, 1984b).
Milk is the most stable food of the livestock products. It is consumed as fresh and
sour milk, and consumed with tea, blood and grain. The milk yield is determined by
the quality and quantity of pasture and the lactation cycle of the milking animals.
Herders milk the lactating animals according to the milking schedule, allocating the
milk between themselves and the calves. According to Field (1980), the experimen-
tal camels in the Rendilleland yielded the largest quantity of milk 3-7 weeks or 1-2
months after childbirth. The milk yield of 1-2 months after childbirth counted as 1
unit decreased to three-fourth in the third month and to a half during the 4-6 months.
The Rendille leave the calf-camel to suck all its dam’s milk for a month after
childbirth. Then, they share the milk with the calves. A dam-camel has four nipples,
and is milked respectively from two nipples twice a day in the morning and at night
for the second month after childbirth. In other words, a calf-camel shares a half of
the milk of its dam with the Rendille. During the 3-8 months after childbirth, the
Rendille milk the dam-camel from two nipples in the morning, and from four nip-
ples at night. After 9 months, milking is done from four nipples both in the morning
and at night, and for the first time the calf-camel is kept from finishing off what milk
is left. 
According to the Rendille milking schedule, about 38 (three-eighth) - 56% (nine-
sixteenth) of the total amount of milk lactated by a dam-camel is consumed by the
people. Whereas the milk yield varies with the lactation cycle, human milk con-
sumption is not determined by the lactation cycle. Rather, with the milking sched-
ule, the Rendille secure about 40-60% of the total amount of lactated milk.
In general, the dam-animals lactate more milk in the rainy season when good pas-
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ture is available, but less in the dry season. Under a severe drought in Turkanaland,
200 g of milk a day per dam was estimated as an average for the cattle, and 1,400 g
a day per animal for the camel (Itani, 1982). In the 1975-76 drought in the
Rendilleland, 800 g of milk a day was estimated as an average for the cattle and
1,300 g for the camel (Sato, 1980). Normally in 1982, a dam-cattle supplied the
Rendille with 1,200 g of milk daily, and a dam-camel, 2,000 g of milk daily. Camels
can stably supply more milk than cattle.
Unlike milk, meat remains a luxury and is largely reserved for special occasions.
These include both times of festivity and of emergency. In fact, small stock are most
frequently killed in the dry seasons when milk is scarce, and their skins are then sold
or exchanged for grain and other foods and necessities. Thus the herders tend to sell
livestock and its products, not when they have a surplus, but when they are hard up.
Herders drink milk in the rainy season when livestock yield much milk, and eat
meat, blood and grain in the dry season when milk dries up.
Both cattle and camel herders, use small stock as cash animals for elastic small
money besides as food source for home consumption. Cattle and camels, however,
are treated differently. Cattle herders, who keep donkeys as pack-animal, readily sell
more camels for cash, although they use meat and milk of camels. Conversely camel
herders strive to keep their camels, used for transportation, milk and meat. 
Following the laws of supply and demand underlying market economy, herders
are recommended to sell their livestock at the highest price as the rational economic
behaviour. Yet generally speaking, they do not sell their livestock in the rainy season
when milk is abundant. Conversely, as milk decreases with the advent of the dry
season,  they sell their livestock. Livestock is fat in the rainy season and lean in the
dry season. When demand is the greatest and prices the highest, supplies of live-
stock actually declines. In other words, herders tend to sell livestock in time of
depression rather than boom. Under favourable conditions, they engage in what
might be called target-sales, where the objective is to acquire a certain cash sum for
certain purposes. Once this is achieved, the motive for selling livestock diminishes
or disappears.
The herders’ selling behavior is reinforced by the mutual and reciprocal relation-
ship with their livestock dealers, most of whom run either retail or wholesale shops.
The persons left behind in their settlements have less food and cash as the dry sea-
son advances, because their livestock are taken away to the herding camps. They
purchase necessities on credit for a while, and in the rainy season when their live-
stock are back in the settlements, they repay the debt with their livestock. The deal-
ers also can take advantage of such credit transactions. The cost of keeping livestock
to fatten is high in the dry season even if livestock is purchased with low price from
the herders. Through the above credit transaction, the dealers can place the herding
cost on the herders, and also acquire fattened livestock in the rainy season.
Furthermore, they can acquire livestock in the rainy season when supply of livestock
actually declines, and gain more profit at the livestock market when demand is
greater than supply and the price is favourable for suppliers. Thus the relationship
between the herder and the dealer can be described as symbiotic.
When the purchasing policy for livestock from herders was put into effect by the
itinerant auctions of cattle, the Ariaal cattle herders did not respond positively. But
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the Rendille camel herders supplied more cattle to the auctions (Fratkin, 1991).
Importance is attached to small stock as cash animals and camels as animals for
milk in both the societies. However, the Ariaal maintain a cattle-oriented culture
under the influence of the Samburu, the neighbouring cattle herders, and attach more
importance to cattle than to camels for ritual use and bridewealth payment. In con-
trast, the Rendille can readily sell their cattle because they attach more importance
to camels than to cattle. Again, the type of livestock vested with higher social and
cultural value is kept at hand.
II. Household and the Livestock
In the pastoral societies of East Africa, a household composed of man and wife
(or wives) with her (or their) children, is the communal holding group of livestock.
The agnates of the household exercise the legal management of household livestock.
Sons cannot separate their own livestock from their father’s without difficulty,
whereas the household head is obligated to support his household members by dis-
tributing livestock as the need arises.
Upon a father’s death, his legacy is inherited by the children. Whereas the eldest
son is responsible for allocating the legacy livestock, societies follow either the pri-
mogeniture inheritance or the division inheritance (Sato, 1984a). The former is the
inheritance in which most of the legacy livestock are retained within the eldest son’s
household with a few livestock allocated among other children. The latter is the
inheritance in which the legacy livestock are divided among the children.
The Rendille, Gabbra, and Boran peoples follow the primogeniture inheritance.
For them, a father does not transfer the ownership of his livestock to his eldest son
during his lifetime. Instead, the eldest son may be given some livestock by his moth-
er’s eldest brother. At his father’s death, he succeeds to the patrimony and inherits
most of his legacy livestock. The larger part of household camels are successively
retained by the eldest sons from generation to generation, maintaining the primogen-
iture inheritance. This does not necessarily mean, however, that an eldest son
monopolizes all of his father’s camels. Upon inheritance, he is obliged to redistrib-
ute a few heads of livestock to each younger brother and sister.
The division inheritance is typically followed by the Turkana, Karimojong and Jie
peoples. For them, a father transfers the ownership of his livestock among wives
with children during his lifetime for subsistence use and marriage payment, and the
remainig few heads of legacy livestock are inherited by negotiation among his chil-
dren. Household livestock are thus dispersed from generation to generation. There is
an intriguing correspondence among the above two types of inheritance and two
ways of bridewealth payments, namely the fixed payment and the negotiated pay-
ment, which I explain below.
The bridewealth livestock, mainly consisting of large livestock, are handed over
to the bride’s close kin by the groom upon marriage. Bridewealth payments can be
classified roughly into two types: the fixed and negotiated payments. In the former,
the groom is responsible for collecting and paying bridewealth to each convention-
ally designated recipient. For example, the Rendille groom has to hand eight heads
of camels (four male and four female) over to the bride’s brothers, mother, and
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mother’s eldest brother. In societies with fixed payments, the amount of bridewealth
livestock ranges from eight heads (the Rendille, whose per capita holdings is 3.0
heads of camels), through four of cattle (the Boran, whose per capita holdings is 5.5
heads of cattle), to three of camels (the Gabbra, whose per capita holdings is 2.6
heads of camels), which is equal to 0.7 - 2.7 times as many as per capita holdings of
large livestock (Sato, 1984a).
In the negotiated payment, the amount of bridewealth livestock is negotiated and
agreed upon each marriage between the close agnates of the groom and bride, and
the groom is responsible for collecting bridewealth livestock and handing them over,
ideally in toto, to a close agnate, usually the bride’s father, who redistributes them in
turn. Among societies with negotiated payments, the amount of bridewealth live-
stock ranges from five to eighty heads of cattle (the Turkana, whose per capita hold-
ings is 2.8 heads), thirty to seventy (the Jie, whose per capita holding is 3.5 heads)
and thirty to fifty (the Karimojong, whose per capita holding is 3.7 heads), and is
thus equal to 1.8 - 28.6 times as many as per capita holdings of cattle as a whole
(Sato, 1984a). 
Bridewealth tends to be more abundant in societies with negotiated payments
than in those with fixed payments (Goldscmidt, 1974), and conversely, per capita
holdings of livestock is less in the former than in the latter. Moreover, the former
follows the division inheritance, and the latter, the primogeniture (Sato, 1984a). The
paradoxical correlations among bridewealth types, per capita holdings of livestock
and inheritance systems can be explained by both the ways bridewealth livestock is
collected by the groom and redistributed by the recipient.
According to the fixed payment, the groom is responsible for collecting
bridewealth, and then hands it over directly to several recipients who are conven-
tionally designated as the bride’s elementary kin, namely her brothers, mother, and
mother’s brothers, instead of handing it over in a lump to a specified person, such as
the bride’s father. This way, the number of participants in the transactions of
bridewealth livestock is very few, and such interpersonal relationships are conven-
tionally stereotyped. Moreover, it is easier for the groom to collect his bridewealth,
usually by himself and infrequently aided by “his persons,” (1) because the amount of
bridewealth is small.
On the other hand, in negotiated payments, the groom is responsible for collecting
bridewealth, hands it over in a lump sum to a responsible recipient, who in turn
redistributes it. No groom can collect the sufficient amount of bridewealth without
requesting “his persons” for aid, because the amount of bridewealth needed is far
and away from per capita holdings of livestock. Usually, the responsible recipient
also has been already heavily in debt to “his persons’” for his own marriage aid, and
thus, when his daughter gets married, he is pressed to pay back his debt and to redis-
tribute some portion of his daughter’s bridewealth.
It should be remembered that most societies with negotiated payments follow
division inheritance, where household livestock are diffused over the descendants as
generations proceed. It means that the corporate identity based on the communal
holdings of household livestock weakens with the generations, so that each descen-
dant is driven to strengthen his own reliable partnership with “his persons”. The
bridewealth livestock are collected and distributed within a wider interpersonal rela-
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tionships beyond household members, and thus has functions of defining and
strengthening the personal networks of the groom and the bride’s father beyond
individual households, besides confirming affinal relationships. 
It has been said that the bridewealth payments can be expected to be high where
livestock play a relatively insignificant part in the total economy (Jacobs, 1965;
1970; Turton, 1980), and that the negotiated payments derive from the economic
motive, whereas the fixed payments derive from the social (Goldschmidt, 1974).
These arguments, although usuful to some degree, neglect the fact that livestock are
transferred within the framework of social structure. 
The negotiated payments are different from the fixed payments in that the former
has the function of defining and strengthening personal networks of both the groom
and the bride’s father. Such function is closely correlated with the unstable intra-
structure of household. The fixed payments are more pervasive in societies where
the intra-structure of household is regulated and stabilized by the primogeniture
inheritance. In contrast, the negotiated payments are more pervasive in societies
where the intra-structure of household is weakened by the division inheritance.
Bridewealth livestock are used for surmounting such inherent weakness of intra-
household solidarity by activating interpersonal relationships beyond the individual
household.
III. Social Transactions and Transfers of Livestock in the Rendille Society
Among the pastoral societies of East Africa, livestock are used for social transac-
tions that bind and regulate societal interactions. When certain livestock are trans-
ferred between partners, one recognizes that the breadth of one’s decision-making is
different from society to society because the motives and occasions for livestock
transactions and the types of livestock involved are prescribed by social conven-
tions. The East Cushitic peoples, such as the Rendille, Gabbra and Boran peoples,
have the peculiar system of livestock transfer classified as the trust system, whereas
the East Nilotic peoples, such as the Turkana, Karimojong, Jie, Maasai and Samburu
peoples, do not. Such difference is derived not only from the number of animals
reared and the scarcity of livestock.
For example, the Rendille have four forms of transaction, namely, gift, exchange,
loan and trust. Gift transaction means transferring one’s personal camel to another
for no direct return, whereas exchange transaction is for a direct return. Loan trans-
action means transferring a camel to another on condition that the transferred camel
itself is returned in the future according to a prescribed convention, and trust trans-
action means transferring female camels in accordance with the rules of the trust
system (Sato, 1992).
In any camel transaction, there is a clear distinction between the personal camel
(alal) and the trust camel (maal), and this is confirmed by the persons concerned.
Personal camels are valued higher than trust camels. A man who keeps his personal
camel can dispose it as he pleases. All male camels are categorized as personal
camels, whereas female camels can be either personal or trust camels. The trustee
has no ownership of the trust camels, but holds usufruct rights to their milk, blood,
and male offspring. He has to return the camel to his trustor at his request. As long
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as any trust camel, including the one originally entrusted and its female offspring, is
alive, the eldest sons of both parties inherit the credits and debts of their fathers over
generations.
The trustee can sublease either the entrusted camel itself or its female offspring to
a third party of his choice. A chain of trust relations is then formed on the basis of
the dyadic interpersonal relation between the trustor and his immediate trustee.
Along the chain of trust relations, any trustee must mark the trust camel as
instructed by the first trustor. The first trustor (the owner of original personal camel)
retains the ultimate credit, so he is regarded as the owner of all the trust camels
transferred through the chain of trust relations. When he irrevocably falls out with
the trustees, the first trustor can forcibly withdraw all the trust camels.
The first trustee never subleases the trust camel to the close agnates of his trustor
if he belongs to the same clan as the trustor; nor does he sublease it to the clansmen
of his trustor if he belongs to a different clan. In the whole chain of trust relations,
the close agnates and clansmen demarcate a double boundary, which functions like a
semi-permeable membrane. Those trust camels which have been once placed
beyond their boundary cannot be brought back in through subleasing. In other
words, the solidarity among the close agnates and clansmen becomes obvious in the
trust system (Sato, 1992).
As mentioned above, the trust system works through the medium of the unity of a
father with his eldest son. Fundamentally it works on the basis of the favourable
societal relations, and at the same time it works together with the structural frame-
work of the more corporate groups of close agnates and clansmen within the patri-
lineal descent group. 
On some occasions and in some social relations, a man is obliged to donate his
personal camels to another. Such occasions include the death of parents, circumci-
sion, the killing of an enemy, and marriage. If an eldest son is circumcised or kills
an enemy, he is entitled to at least one female camel from his mother’s eldest
brother, whereas on the same occasion, the other sons are entitled to at least one
female camel from his father. Upon marriage, the groom has to pay eight personal
camels (four male and four female) as bridewealth to the bride’s elementary kin,
such as her mother, brothers and mother’s eldest brother. Moreover, the bride’s
eldest brother is expected to give one female camel out of his sister’s bridewealth to
his father’s brother’s son. Since the bride’s father has no share in the bridewealth
camels of his daughter, he cannot divert them to his own marriage.
The above occasions are landmarks in the developmental cycle of the household
as well as in the age-set cycle. The eldest son is obliged to donate personal camels to
his own and his wife’s elementary kin, his father’s brother’s eldest son, and his sis-
ter’s eldest son, and conversely he can receive personal camels from his sister’s hus-
band, his sister’s daughter’s husband, and his mother’s eldest brother. I call the
category of these persons, “effective kindred.” The relationships among the effective
kindred are maintained and reinforced by the reciprocal donation of personal
camels, and are structured not only by the unity of a father with his eldest son, but
also by the relationship of a mother’s eldest brother to a sister’s eldest son, and by
the relationship among the eldest sons within close agnates.
I have analyzed elsewhere (Sato, 1994) the actual camel transfers made by three
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sons from one household. The total number of transfers counted 149, of which
donations of female and male personal camels (44 and 41 cases, respectively) made
up 58% and trusts 39% (58 cases), adding up to 97% of the total transfers. The
remaining 3% was repayment and exchange of camels. In terms of social relations
between the partners of the transfers, 99% of  the 85 donations were carried out
among effective kindred; 90% were household members, wife’s elementary kin and
sister’s household members. In contrast, 31% of the 58 trust camels were transferred
to patrilineal clansmen, 28% to classificatory clansmen and 19% to household mem-
bers. Trust camels were transferred to a wider circle of people than other transfer
camels were, based on ego-centred dyadic relations.
The occasions of transfers were mostly marriage and circumcision, respectively
40% and 13% of the total. Those for pledge of bond-friendship formed at age-set
ceremonies, represented 10%. As a whole, 63% were transferred on occasions
related to the age-set cycle. To note, 40% of all the transfers were carried out
between age-mates, and the members of the senior age-set tended to give camels to
those of the junior age-set. Thus, the age system serves as an important provider of
camel transfers (Sato, 1998).
IV. Pliability of Camel Transaction
For the Rendille, the four forms of transaction above are formal classifications. In
reality, one form of transaction can turn into another, depending on the relative
degree of solidarity between the giver and recipient, and the circumstances of trans-
action. 
Sometimes, a calf-camel is adopted in order to ensure milk from the mother-
camel. When one requests a calf-camel from another for the purpose of adoption,
the latter usually gives away either one male calf as a personal camel or one female
calf as a trust camel. But I came across a case where one female calf was donated as
a personal camel for the purpose of adoption. In this case, a man was donated a
female calf by his mother’s eldest brother in return for the female camel which his
father once handed over to the latter as a personal camel in compliance with his
request for bridewealth aid.
A lactating camel is temporarily lent out to someone for the duration of lactation,
and soon after lactation stops, the borrower has to return it to the lender. But, there
was a case where a son-in-law lent out a lactating female with a suckling calf to his
father-in-law and then turned it into a trust camel. The reason was that the loan
camel with milk should be treated as trust camel once it bore a calf in the borrower’s
pen. That camel bore a calf while the son-in-law refrained from requesting its return.
The above transactions were made through moral reciprocity.
The Rendille have a standardized exchange rate for one type of livestock to
another. For example, one head of heifer-camel is equivalent to either one head of
heifer or 12 heads of adolescent small stock. Also, one female calf of either camel or
cattle is exchangeable for one ox-camel or ox. This exchange rate is applicable to
neither transactions with livestock dealers nor those at the livestock market, where
transactions are negotiated, but applicable only to transactions within the communal
Rendille society. Also, one type of livestock may be exchanged with livestock com-
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bined with other goods, for example, sack of maize. 
Some conventional barters may take place over time, even as long as after twenty
years, within Rendille society. Usually, the giver of female camel can claim cancel-
lation of the barter, either if his camel reproduced overly in favour of the recipient,
or if the transaction had violated the conventional exchange rate. Such unexpected
profit on the part of the recipient or subjective hindsight of distorted exchange is
sufficient for the original owner to contest the transaction. The contestation is never
treated indifferently and taken up publicly. This suggests that excessive profit
through barter of livestock is checked by public opinion and that the owner of per-
sonal camel can exercise very strong discretion.
Whereas camels are esteemed more than cattle by the Rendille, there is less
demand for camels, and prices offered often fall short of the herder’s expectation.
Therefore, he first exchanges the less demanded camel for the more demanded cattle
using the conventional rate in his network, and then sells that cattle in the market.
This manipulation of the local dual economy enables the he rder get through the dis-
advantage to market economy. 
CONCLUSION
Ecological carrying capacity and optimal herd-size, often used as driving con-
cepts for promoting market economy and incorporating local herding systems into
it, are not applicable to the tropical arid zone. The concept of productivity is too
arbitrary for application to East Africa because it is estimated differently from index
to index. For the precarious and drought-ridden tropical habitats, the maximizing
strategy of the nomadic herders is more adaptive. I advocate that every effort must
be made not only to understand the complex herding ecology and to preserve and
promote its most productive aspects, but also to clarify and uphold the indigenous
rationality against the hitherto implied irrationality. 
With the devastation from the recent catastrophic droughts, government adminis-
tration and policies promoting market economy has encroached rapidly into indige-
nous pastoral area, together with the international development programs since the
1970’s. The Rendille and other pastoral societies in East Africa have undergone
drastic changes and become marginalized. Hogg (1986) noted that economic differ-
entiation was increasingly polarizing the Isiolo Borana society and that the commu-
nal ties hitherto bound by the ethos of equality were weakened. He called this
phenomenon, “new pastoralism,” in which, the wealthy take advantage of their
socio-economic standing to elevate their status, while the poor are forced to become
employed as wage herders or drop out from pastoral economy. The same phenome-
non of economic and social polarization has been also reported for the Chamus
(Little, 1985).
However, Rendille camel pastoralism is persistent. Camels are treated as livestock
symbolic of their well-being. Camels are also their essential means of production,
and at the same time important property of social exchange through which the soli-
darity of kindred is enforced and networks of favourable friends expanded.
Historically, social and economic polarization has been latently inherent in nomadic
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pastoralism, and the Rendille have refined livestock transactions in order to build
social insurance. Camel transactions are collectively activated through the age-set
cycle as well as the kindred network. The legal ownership is closely interconnected
with the social structure and excessive profit is checked by the public pressure,
maintaining social and economic coexistence. 
The Rendille are indeed more involved in market economy than ever before, yet,
they never sell female camels for cash. When they need cash, they first exchange
camels with cattle using conventional exchange rate, and then supply these cattle to
the market. Such manipulation of the local dual economy, and the symbiotic per-
sonal relationships with the local dealers still buffer the Rendille from encroaching
market economy.
NOTES
(1) Among the pastoral societies of East Africa, the term “one’s persons,” for example etaya
meaning my person in the Rendille and ngitungakan in the Turkana (Gulliver, 1955), is
commonly referred to as those persons who have trustable and reciprocal supportive rela-
tions with him, and always expressed with deep reverence. They have affectionate sym-
pathy for each other on the basis of moral duty and obligations, and are confirmed by
reciprocal transactions of livestock, other gifts, and good will, if necessary. They are indi-
vidually and voluntarily created as significant kindred from other kindred and as particu-
lar friends from other friends.
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